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(See, also, Comer v. Associated Almond Growers, 101 Cal.App.
687 [282 P. 532]; 30 Am.Jur. § 207, p. 944; 50 C.J.S. § 597,
p. 15; Rest. of Judg., § 62, at p. 257.)
Various cases cited by the defendant (e.g. Estate of Keet,
15 Cal.2d 328 [100 P.2d 1045] ; Ernsting v. United Stages,
Inc., 206 Cal. 733 [276 P. 103]; Henderson v. Miglietta,
206 Cal. 125 [273 P. 581]; Gaskill v. Wallace, 32 Cal.App.2d
354 [89 P.2d 687]), involving the effect of the res judicata
doctrine and the admission of the evidence outside the judgment roll of the earlier action are not in point. No waiver
of a right to rely on the prior judgment was shown by the
comments of court and counsel as is true in this case. The
defendant's argument that he did nothing to prevent proof
of negligence in the earlier action ignores the fact that he
secured a judgment in that action on the basis of a representation that a contractual liability only was involved.
The findings and conclusions of the trial court are supported by the record.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J.,
Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.

[Crim. No. 5269. In Bank. Mar. 7, 1952.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. ROBERT GENE
DESSAUER, Appellant.
[1] Homicide- Evidence- Deliberation and Premeditation.-Defendant's statement to arresting officers that he purchased a
gun intending to kill his woman companion and carried out
that intent is sufficient evidence to show that the murder was
perpetrated by a "willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing."
(Pen. Code, § 189.)
[2] Id.-Evidence-Premeditation.-1\!Iere statement by defendant
to arresting officers that his motive in killing his woman companion was to have her die while she was happy does not eliminate the element of premeditation, and in any event need not
be believed by the court in a nonjury case.
McK. Dig. References: [1-3] Homicide, § 158; [ 4] Homicide,
§§ 149, 158; [5, 6] Criminal Law, § 106; [7] Criminal Law, § 1079;
[8] Criminal Law, § 235(3); [9] Stipulations, § 3(3); [10] Homicide, § 242; [11] Criminal Law, § 480; [12] Homicide, § 273.
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[3] Id.-Evidence-Motive.-Establishment of motive for commission of a homicide is not indispensable to support a conviction.
[4] !d.-Evidence-Corpus Delicti: Deliberation and Premeditation.-Evidence that defendant had a gun in the back of his
car, that he entered the back seat rather than the front seat
where his woman companion was seated, and that, after a
conversation with her and with no apparent provocation, he
aimed the gun at the back of her head and shot her four
times, causing her death, is sufficient to indicate an intent to
kill and is proof of the corpus delicti aside from his extrajudicial statements to the arresting officers; such statements,
together with the other evidence, clearly establish deliberation
and premeditation.
[5] Criminal Law-Rights of Accused-Right to be Confronted by
Witnesses-Waiver.-Right of accused to be confronted by
witnesses, whether assured by the Constitution or statute, may
be waived, and a trial may be had on the transcript of the
evidence taken at the preliminary hearing on stipulation by
defendant and his counsel or by the latter's stipulation, at
least when made in defendant's presence.
[6] !d.-Rights of Accused-Right to be Confronted by Witnesses
-Waiver.-Right of accused to confront the doctors or alienists making reports as to the sanity issue may be waived.
[7] Id.-Appeal-Objections-Evidence.-A waiver or failure to
object to the admission of evidence precludes objection on
appeal.
[8] !d.-Right to Separate Trial on Insanity Issue-Waiver.-At
least in a case tried by the court without a jury, the right to
have guilt and insanity separately tried may be waived.
[9] Stipulations-Subject Matter-Evidence.-Defendant's counsel
may stipulate that the degree and penalty of the murder
charged can be determined on the evidence adduced at the trial.
[10] Homicide-Punishment for First Degree Murder-Discretion
of Jury.-Any right of defendant in a homicide case to invoke
Pen. Code, § 190, which provides that persons guilty of first
degree murder shall suffer death or life imprisonment at the
discretion of the jury "trying the same," is waived where the
right to a trial by jury has been waived.
[11] Criminal Law-Evidence-Confessions-Review.-A defendant charged with murder may not suecessfully urge that there
was no showing that the statement he made to the police
[3] See Cal.Jur., Homicide,§ 74; Am.Jur., Homicide,§ 465.
[5] See Cal.Jur., Criminal Law, § 76; Am.Jur., Criminal Law,
§ 188.
[7] See Cal.Jur., Criminal Law, § 516; Am.Jur., Appeal and
Error, § 343.
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following the crime was free and voluntary, where there was
no intimation during the trial that the statement was coerced
in any respect, no suggestion of coercion was made at the
time he was questioned on direct examination in regard to
the manner in which his statement was made, and he testified
that he told a different story to the police then and on the
stand as to why he purchased the gun used in the crime, because
he thought the officers wanted him to answer that way or
because of despondency.
[12] Homicide-Appeal-Modification of Judgment.-Where the
evidence is ample to establish first degree murder and no
prejudicial error was committed by the trial court, the Supreme
Court has no power to reduce the degree of the crime or the
penalty imposed.

APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239)
from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County
and from an order denying a new trial. Clement D. Nye,
Judge. Affirmed.
Prosecution for murder. ,Judgment of conviction imposing
death penalty affirmed.
Morris Lavine for Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Stanford D.
Herlick, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
CARTER, J.-Defendant pleaded not guilty and not guilty
by reason of insanity to a charge of murder. After trial
by the court sitting without a jury he was found sane and
guilty of murder of the first degree and sentenced to death.
His motion for a new trial was denied. The case is here
on automatic appeal from the judgment and order denying the new trial.
Defendant, 28 years of age, and Libby Bershad, the victim of the homicide, had been living together as husband
and wife since June, 1950, without legal sanction. Apparently one source of their income for a living embraced various activities, such as prostitution by Libby, bad check passing and the "badger" game, wherein she would entice a
man into their living· quarters and while they were in a
compromising situation, defendant, posing as her husband,
would enter demanding monetary satisfaction.
According to defendant's testimony in court, he and Libby
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left their place of abode in Hollywood to do some shopping
about 7 in the morning on April 2, 1951. After articles of
apparel were purchased for Libby with cash and bad checks,
they returned to Hollywood in defendant's car arriving
about 2 in the afternoon. They stopped in front of a bank
and Libby gave him a check to cash. He entered the bank
to cash the check, but knowing it would not be paid, he got
"cold feet" and returned to the car, taking a position in
the rear seat, Libby being in front, where a discussion ensued in which he told her why he did not attempt to pass
the check, and she told him he should not have been afraid.
'fhey did not have an argument or quarrel. He owned a
gun which he had placed on the floor in front of the back
seat of the car. While she was facing forward, he held the
gun about 8 inches from the back of her head and shot four
times, causing her death. He then left the car intending
to surrender to the authorities. Not finding an officer he
attended a theater for about an hour. He went to a restaurant where he made some notes on blank checks, and about
8 in the evening called the police. They came to the restaurant and took him into custody. He denied he had any
intent to kill Libby before the shots were fired or that he
purchased the gun to kill her. He said he shot her because
she was in trouble and would eventually be imprisoned; he
also said he had purchased the gun at Libby's suggestion
for protection and to use in the "badger" games.
In a statement made to the officers, defendant stated that
Libby and he had discussed suicide because they had nothing
for which to live and she had attempted it several times;
that he first decided to kill Libby about a month before
the homicide "because she told me that life, as it was, wasn't
worth living, she wasn't having a very good time, and neither
was I, it was rough and unpleasant, and we saw no end in
sight, a happy end"; because they were unhappy by reason
of lack of money; that he purchased the gun for the "specific reason'' of killing her; that he carried his plans to conclusion on the day of the homicide; and that he put the
gun in his pocket on the morning of that day before they
left their home with the thought of killing her.
[1] Contrary to defendant's contention the evidence is
adequate to establish first degree murder. His statement to
the officers shows that he purchased the gun intending to
kill Libby and carried out that intent. Clearly, there is
sufficient evidence to show that murder was perpetrated by
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a ''willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing.'' (Pen.
Code, § 189.) [2] Defendant seems to think that because
he said his motive was to have her die while she was happy
the element of premeditation was eliminated. This does not
necessarily follow, but even if it did, the court could have
disbelieved that evidence. The killing could be found
to be malicious, because ''. . . malice may be express or
implied. It is express when there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellowcreature. It is implied, when no considerable provocation
appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing
show an abandoned and malignant heart.'' (Pen. Code,
§ 188.) [3] Moreover, the establishment of a motive for
the commission of a homicide is not indispensable to support a conviction. (People v. lsby, 30 Cal.2d 879 [186 P.2d
405]; 13 Cal.Jur. 685.)
[4] Further in this connection defendant urges that
the statements of defendant to the officers could not be used
to show the premeditation and deliberation sufficient to establish the crime of murder of the first degree; and that
such must be proved by other evidence. If he is speaking
of proof of the corpus delicti, there was adequate evidence
aside from his extrajudicial statements to establish it. It
will be recalled that there is evidence that he had the gun
in the back of his car and when he returned to the car
from the bank he entered the back seat rather than the
front seat where Libby was seated. .After a conversation
with her and with no apparent provocation he aimed the
gun at the back of her head and shot her four times. That
is sufficient to indicate an intent to kill and proof of the
corpus delicti aside from his extrajudicial statements. (See
People v. Corrales, 34 Cal.2d 426 [210 P.2d 843] ; People
v. JJ1ehaffey, 32 Cal.2d 535 [197 P.2d 12]; People v. Stroble,
36 Cal.2d 615 [226 P.2d 330].) If he means that his
statements cannot be used in support of the proof of deliberation and premeditation, and hence, first degreee murder,
he cites no authority so holding. His statements together
with the other evidence clearly established deliberation and
premeditation. (See People v. Briggs, 20 Cal.2d 42 [123
P.2d 433] .) In People v. Howa.rd, 211 Cal. 322 [295 P. 333,
71 A.L.R. 1385], relied upon by him there were no facts
in the extrajudicial statement from which premeditation
could be inferred. In People v. Thomas, 25 Cal.2d 880 [156
P.2d 7], the court was pointing out the closeness of the case
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and hence the necessity for correct instructions on deliberation and premeditation. The admissions there made and
other evidence are not comparable to this case.
Under a claim of denial of due process of law, defendant
makes various contentions that the State's case was based
on the transcript of the testimony taken at the preliminary
hearing, and as to the sanity issue, on reports, rather than
testimony in court, by alienists, containing sordid accounts
of defendant's sex life, and that there was no confrontation
of witnesses against him. Defendant was represented by
counsel at the preliminary hearing and witnesses were crossexamined. He and his counsel waived a trial by jury on
both the issue of guilt and insanity. His counsel at the
opening of the trial stipulated that ''the People's case may
be submitted to the Court on the testimony taken at the
preliminary examination; that the Court may read the transcript of that testimony to the same force and effect as though
those witnesses were here, sworn and testified, the defendant
waiving his right to further cross examination of those witnesses and waiving his right to be confronted by those witnesses, and any stipulations entered into at the preliminary
hearing may be deemed entered into at this proceeding, and
any exhibits received at the preliminary hearing may be
received and marked as exhibits here.'' The use of doctors'
reports was also stipulated, as will more fully appear later
herein. [5] The right to be confronted by witnesses, whether
assured by Constitution or statute, may be waived, and a
trial may be had on the transcript of the evidence taken
at the preliminary hearing on stipulation by defendant and
his counsel (People v. Wallin, 34 Cal.2d 777 [215 P.2d 1] ),
or by the latter's stipulation, at least when made in defendant's presence. (People v. Rornero, 100 Cal.App.2d 352
[223 P.2d 511]; People v. Young, 100 Cal.App.2d 488 [224
P.2d 46] .) [6] It follows that the right to confront the
doctors was also properly waived. Insofar as the admissibility
of the reports is concerned that cannot be raised in the face
of the stipulation. [7] A waiver or failure to object to the admission of evidence precludes objection on appeal. ( 8 Cal.
Jur. 500 et seq.) In any event no prejudice has been shown.
(See People v. Stroble, sttpra, 36 Cal.2d 615.)
After the prosecution had finished its case on the issue
of guilt, the court called defendant's counsel's attention to
the fact that the previous stipulations had not covered the
doctors' reports on the issue of insanity. Defendant's counsel
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then stipulated "that the Court may read and consider the
reports of the doctors on the second issue of not guilty by
reason of insanity . . . . [T]hat the Court may read and
consider the reports of the doctors, Dr. Bielinski and Dr.
Tucker, submitted as a result of their appointment under
Section 1026 and following Sections of the Penal Code in
determining the issue of the Defendant's plea of not guilty
by reason of insanity. . . . And such other doctors' reports
as may be submitted by either prosecution or defense.'' A
report by a Dr. Bailey was submitted by defendant's counsel. 'l'he People then rested and defendant was called to
the stand and testified. After defendant rested the State
called a rebuttal witness. At the end of the case defendant's counsel stipulated that both issues, guilt and insanity,
could be determined ''at the one pronouncement.'' The court
then found defendant guilty of murder of the first degree
and sane. At the time of pronouncement of the sentence,
defendant stood mute when asked if there was any legal
cause why sentence should not be pronounced, and his counsel said there was no cause. The death penalty was imposed.
In that state of the record defendant contends that a reversal is required because the two issues were not tried separately, as required by the statute reading: "When a defendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity, and also
joins with it another plea or pleas, he shall first be tried
as if he had entered such other plea or pleas only, and in
such trial he shall be conclusively presumed to have been
sane at the time the offense is alleged to have been committed. If the jury shall find the defendant guilty . . .
then the question whether the defendant was sane or insane
at the time the offense was committed shall be promptly
tried, either before the same jury or before a new jury in
the discretion of the court. In such trial the jury shall
return a verdict either that the defendant was sane at the
time the offense was committed or that he was insane at
the time the offense was committed. If the verdict or finding be that the defendant was sane at the time the offense
was committed, the court shall sentence the defendant as
provided by law.'' (Pen. Code, § 1026.) Defendant also
contends that evidence was not taken to determine the penalty, that a jury was not summoned for that purpose and
that those things could not be waived.
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It is clear from the record that the manner of conducting
the trial on the issues and determining the penalty was
with the consent of defendant's counsel. He, at no time,
made any objection to the procedure. He either tacitly or
expressly assented. In regard to the penalty the court had
all the facts surrounding the commission of the crime before
it and also the reports of three doctors on defendant's mental
status.
[8] At least in a case tried by the court without a jury
the right to have guilt and insanity separately tried may
be waived. (People v. Hazelwood, 24 Cal.App.2d 690 [76
P.2d 151] ; People v. Pettinger, 94 Cal.App. 297 [271 P.
132].) Those cases have not been disapproved, as claimed
by defendant, by the later cases such as People v. French,
12 Cal.2d 720 [87 P.2d 1014], setting forth the procedure
for separation of the trial of the two issues. Moreover, defendant has not shown he suffered prejudice. (People v.
Stroble, supra, 36 Cal.2d 615.)
[9] In regard to the determination of the degree and
penalty it is settled that defendant's counsel may stipulate
that they be determined on the evidence adduced at the trial.
(People v. Walker, 33 Cal.2d 250 [201 P.2d 6] ; People v.
Thomas, 37 Cal.2d 74 [230 P .2d 351].) That is in effect
the situation here.
[10] In regard to the lack of a jury to determine the
penalty to be imposed, defendant invokes section 190 of the
Penal Code, which provides that persons guilty of first degree murder shall suffer death or life imprisonment at the
discretion of the jury ''trying the same.'' If any such
right existed it was waived, as seen from the above discussion. Moreover, where the case is tried by the court after the
jury has been waived we do not have a case within the language of section 190, that is, where the jury is trying it.
Defendant urges that the waivers should not be sustained
because defendant's sanity was doubtful and he could not be
expected to act intelligently. The alienists appointed by the
court and the one chosen by defendant all agreed that defendant was sane at the time of the commission of the crime
and when examined. The trial was had on July 18, 1951,
and the reports of those doctors were dated July 16, May
29 and 27, 1951. From his testimony at the trial he appeared entirely rational.
[11] Defendant contends that there was no showing that
the statement he made to the police was free and voluntary.
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There was no intimation or suggestion at any time during
the trial that the statement was coerced in any respect. Defendant was questioned on direct examination in regard to
the manner in which his statement was taken and no suggestion of coercion was mentioned. He testified that he told
a different story to the police then and on the stand as
to why he purchased the gun, to "obviate things," that is,
because he thought the officers wanted him to answer that
way or because of despondency.
[12] Defendant contends that the offense should be reduced by this court to second degree murder, or the penalty
reduced to life imprisonment. The evidence, however, is,
as we have seen, ample to establish first degree murder and
no prejudicial error was committed by the trial court. This
court has no power to reduce the degree of the crime or
the penalty imposed in the absence of error, or to review
the discretion of the trial court in fixing the penalty. (People v. Odle, 37 Oal.2d 52 [230 P.2d 345] ; People v. Thomas,
supra, 37 Oal.2d 74 [230 P.2d 351].)
The judgment and order are affirmed.
Gibson, 0. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.
Schauer, J., concurred in the judgment.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied March 31,
1952.

